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Chandler 1
1. INTRODUCTION: WHY AN ETHIC OF CARE?
The philosophy of biomedical ethics provides modern day health care workers, patients,
and philosophers with a normative framework in which to make moral deliberations concerning
the meaning of health and the meaning of a good life. The paradigm of justice has bound health
care providers and patients to an approach that is premised on impartial abstraction and universal
application of principles. However, many contend that this approach to biomedical ethics is
practically flawed and limits the roles of health care providers to deliver adequate “care.”
Namely, theorists defending a care orientation in biomedical ethics consider the justice approach
to bioethics as undermining those efforts, which support patient autonomy, interpersonal
relationships, and the development of caring attitudes in medical relationships.
The decisional responses of health care professionals in regard to their patients are often
moral in nature insofar as the decisions these professionals make concern the ultimate essence of
human mortality manifested in particular medical conditions. The locus of this essence can be
found in the interactions of patients and health care providers.1 What I am primarily investigating
here is how the caring perspective develops and sustains these moral relationships in clinical
interactions. More specifically, I am evaluating the strengths and limitations of both the caring
perspective and a principlist instantiation of the justice perspective in biomedical ethics in order
to review the theoretical implications of these perspectives for moral epistemology in medicine
as well as their practical ramifications for the institution of health care. I argue that we need both
care and justice perspectives in order to acknowledge the real inequalities (of knowledge, power,
socio-economic status, race, gender, etc.) between health care professionals and patients. In this
way, we may discover new avenues for employing our philosophical concepts to concrete and

1

Virginia A. Sharpe, “Justice and Care: The Implications of the Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate for Medical
Ethics,” Theoretical Medicine 13 (1992): 307.
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contextualized medical situations. The bulk of my analysis will involve thorough explication of
Virginia Ashby Sharpe’s “Justice and Care: The Implications of the Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate
for Medical Ethics.” Sharpe’s article reviews the two orientations and concludes that the care
orientation is congruent with Dr. Edmund Pellegrino’s theory of medical morality within the
healing relationship between physician and patient. For Pellegrino, one of the essential questions
to ask is what “should the relationship be of formal philosophy to medical ethics?”2 Through my
analysis of the ethics of care and its specific relationship to biomedical ethics, I will consider
various responses to this question to support a richer and more diverse understanding of how we
can respond to the suffering and needs of others within medical contexts.

2

Edmund D. Pellegrino, “The Four Principles and the Doctor-Patient Relationship,” in The Philosophy of
Medicine Reborn: A Pellegrino Reader, edited by H. Tristram Engelhardt and Fabrice Jotterand (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 197.
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2. WHAT IS THE ETHICS OF CARE?
It is important to sort out what exactly is meant by an ethic of care, especially within the
context of medicine and nursing where terms like “health care,” “medical care,” and “nursing
care” are frequently expressed. This requires a brief review of the history of caring in the
philosophical and medical traditions. In his Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Warren T. Reich explores
many of the early roots of caring and the implications of these origins for contemporary care
theory and bioethics. One of the earliest and most significant of these origins is the care of the
souls tradition in ancient Greece and Rome. We find our common notion of “taking care of the
whole person” embedded in the ancient concern of care for souls, both the internal experience of
solitude and calling attention to suffering as a subjective experience.3 Suffering is experiential
and subjective, so acknowledging the experience of the sufferer is the first step to caring for the
greater “whole” of the person.4 Centuries later, Goethe constructs a narrative with his character
Faust, illustrating how striving for success in one’s life while suppressing concern for others
results in both internal and external harm.5 For David Hume, passions and moral emotions are
the primary motivators for action and moral judgments are grounded in sentiments and not
reason.6 During the development of existentialism and phenomenology, figures like Kierkegaard
and Heidegger reformulated the fundamental question for ethics into “how should I live?”7 In the
1920s, “caring for” the patient became a more focused moral concern in health care with

3

Warren T. Reich, “History of the Notion of Care,” ed. Warren T. Reich, Encyclopedia of Bioethics (New
York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1995), 321.
4

Ibid., 321.

5

Ibid., 322.

6

Ibid., 327.

7

Ibid., 323.
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increased interest in a virtue of care as the simple moral orientation to health care, based in
feelings for the other.8 This shift in concern to “care for” the patient assisted in the redefining of
ethics in medicine and roles of health care professionals amidst the high-rate of medical
discoveries and technological developments, which often overshadowed the care of the
individual. Finally, feminist perspectives on care during the 1980s produced a movement in
which challenges in nursing and female perspectives in medicine were reevaluated. Problems in
nursing, such as depersonalization of health care due to the fragmentation of specialized
treatment, highly institutionalized bureaucracies, and the overshadowing of individual patient
needs by a shift in emphasis to the technological process of curing are just a few of the problems
that feminists, in particular, have recognized.9 Modern health care, especially the care of those
who suffer, continues to face a vast variety of these challenges.
Carol Gilligan changed the conversation of “caring” in her book In a Different Voice.10
Gilligan’s contributions to moral psychology have major ramifications for the development of
moral epistemology within the ethics of care. Feminists and care theorists frequently cite
Gilligan and recognize her work as essential to the move away from the predominant ethical
theories, like Kantianism, which as a result of duty-based priorities, have often neglected the
particular concerns of concrete individuals. Some instantiations of deontological theories and
justice approaches to ethics, such as Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory, portray women as morally
deficient.11, 12 A key transformative question in how we approach medicine or suffering is not

8

Warren T. Reich, “Historical Dimensions of an Ethic of Care in Health Care,” Encyclopedia of Bioethics
(New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1995), 334.
9

Ibid., 335.

10

Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982).
11

Sharpe, “Justice and Care: The Implications of the Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate for Medical Ethics,” 300.
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asking, “what is ‘just?’” but “how to respond?”13 Through her study of young girls and women,
Gilligan located two different ethical orientations. Men tend to follow the justice orientation,
where the focus on inequality is their main concern and women tend to follow the care
orientation, where they focus on equality and personal attachment.14 This distinction of justice
and care is my primary concern as it relates to concrete medical situations. Gilligan emphasizes
the fact of our humanly interdependence between other individuals with specific needs and
goals.15 Furthermore, this interdependence in care privileges responsibilities and responding to
the needs of others.16
Nel Noddings’ model of caring builds on and expands Gilligan’s work in moral
psychology. However, where Gilligan conceptualizes caring as moral reasoning, Noddings
envisions caring as a practical activity.17 In Caring, Noddings states that, “to care may mean to
be charged with the protection, welfare, or maintenance of something or someone,”

12

Kohlberg’s theory defines morality not in terms of its content but rather “in terms of the formal character
of a moral judgment” by emphasizing the traits of universality and impartiality. In taking the view that “morality is
justice,” Kohlberg assumes a formalistic approach to ethics, which disallows us to approach morality on partial or
relational grounds. Additionally, in Kohlberg’s study, men and women are afforded differing levels of moral
maturity. For Kohlberg, women eventually fail to meet the standards of Kohlberg’s theory by focusing on individual
interests. Gilligan considers this view flawed theoretically and empirically. For more on Gilligan’s dispute with
Kohlberg, see Sharpe “Justice and Care,” 300-301.
13

Sharpe, “Justice and Care: The Implications of the Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate for Medical Ethics,” 313.

14

Warren T. Reich, “Contemporary Ethics of Care,” Encyclopedia of Bioethics (New York: Simon &
Schuster Macmillan, 1995), 337.
15

Alisa L. Carse, “Impartial Principle and Moral Context: Securing a Place for the Particular in Ethical
Theory,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 23, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): 164-65, accessed January 16, 2016,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1076/jmep.23.2.153.8923.
16

Margaret Olivia Little, “Care: From Theory to Orientation and Back,” Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy 23, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): 192, http://dx.doi.org/10.1076/jmep.23.2.190.8922.
17

Reich, “Contemporary Ethics of Care,” 338.
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demonstrating the qualities of receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness.18 This charge
certainly concerns health professionals and their responsibilities to patients. With just a brief
introduction to the development of caring in health care, the justice-care distinction still requires
some in-depth theoretical unpacking.
Ethical theorists and writers in bioethics often describe “care” or “caring” as a
perspective, virtue, theory, orientation, or ideal. In their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress interpret the ethics of care as a form of virtue ethics insofar as it
privileges the characteristics of interpersonal relationships.19 A virtue here is understood as a
dispositional trait or feelings with a particular motivation(s), which signifies its belonging to
virtue theory.20, 21 Virtues drive normative behavior and signify the moral praiseworthiness (or
wickedness) of individual actions. Simply put, virtue ethics is concerned with sustaining a moral
theory from character traits that enable and incline an individual to make the right kind of
action.22 The general consensus among philosophers is that care ethics is a form of virtue ethics.
This view is affirmed by Virginia A. Sharpe but dissented by Virginia Held, who offers a sharp
distinction between the ethics of care and virtue ethics in which she attributes the former to

18

Sara T. Fry, “The Role of Caring in a Theory of Nursing Ethics,” in Feminist Perspectives in Medical
Ethics, ed. Helen Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1992), 5.
19

Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 35.
20

Ibid., 31.

21

I acknowledge that this interpretation of virtue ethics is disputed within the discipline. This view
presupposes the claim that care ethics fits under virtue ethical theory. However, there are other competing
definitions of virtue ethics. A stronger case can be made that asserts care ethics as a form of virtue ethics, which
makes a more precisely Aristotelian account of virtue ethics. If you accept Hilde Lindemann’s account, care ethics
will look more like virtue ethics. We can also ask the wider question concerning whether virtue ethics is a verison of
care ethics.
22

Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 378.
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particular relationships and the latter to the dispositions of individuals.23At least for Held, “the
central focus of the ethics of care is on the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting
the needs of particular others for whom we take responsibility.”24 I think Held’s stance nicely
encapsulates the general aim of care ethics: recognizing obligations to the other and attending to
the needs of the others. Although some scholars question the epistemological status of care ethics
in our moral deliberations, I do not believe that the debate as to whether care ethics is a genuine
ethical theory or not is especially relevant to my aim here.25 Nevertheless, the dispute of how to
describe the two orientations significantly influences the ways in which they are understood and
interpreted. At least for this thesis, I will use the terms “perspective” and “orientation”
interchangeably to describe the ethics of care as defended by Virginia Sharpe.
With a more structured outline of the ethics of care, I think we may concretize our
understanding of these concepts more effectively. Hilde Lindemann offers three general features
of caring, which are helpful to conceptualizing interpersonal relationships premised on an ethic
of care. First, there is the expression of a caring relationship. “Caring” is a moral term insofar as
we can use it to guide our feelings and know when to act on those feelings as well as evaluate
particular instances of caring.26 Second, caring involves the “engagement with another’s will,”
not merely treating them as an object. Instead, the one caring attends to a person with wills,
23

Ibid., 57.

24

Virginia Held, “The Ethics of Care as Moral Theory,” in The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and
Global (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10.
25

Margaret Olivia Little argues in “Care: From Theory to Orientation and Back” that there is a distinction
between orientations and theories. While a theory is a set of propositions (conceptualized narrowly), orientations,
like the care orientation, focus more “in terms of emphases of concern and discernment.” She claims that the care
orientation is not a theory but “a stance from which to do theory” and in this way orientations should not be equated
with theories. See “Care: Theory to Orientation,” 195-196.
26

Hilde Lindemann, "Feminist Ethics of Care and Responsibility," in An Invitation to Feminist Ethics
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 92-93.
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intentions, and desires of her own.27 In this way, the one caring must set aside her wills,
intentions, and desires by acknowledging those of the one who is vulnerable or suffering.28
Third, caring charges one to give attention to the particulars of context instead of being led by
mere abstractions in moral deliberation.29 These three features are certainly not exhaustive
descriptors of an ethic of care. Other virtues or descriptors of care include the traits of sympathy,
compassion, fidelity, and love in intimate personal relationships.30 Later, we will see how
emphasizing our attention to the particular idiosyncrasies of relationships is not entirely
compatible with the justice orientation’s moral emphasis on impartiality and universality. Indeed,
the justice orientation is an inadequate ethical theory alone, for it neglects important specific and
individual aspects of vulnerable persons by emphasizing impartiality. Nevertheless, this basic
structure will guide us as we review the terrain of medical ethics and aim to bring greater
attention to the caring perspective, which unlike the paradigmatic justice perspective, has often
been neglected and underappreciated in conversations concerning patient-provider interactions.
2.1 Feminist Intersections with Care Theory
Contemporary care ethics has many of its origins in feminine and feminist literature.
However, there is an important distinction to be made. In No Longer Patient, Susan Sherwin
interprets “feminine” ethics as those observations of how traditional theories fail to include the

27

Ibid., 93.

28

I want to acknowledge here that I am evaluating the ethics of care within the context of medical ethics, so
any dispositional trait aimed at caring will necessarily have to attend to some sort of metaphysical experience of
pain or suffering. Though vulnerability may also designate the one who is cared for outside of medical contexts, like
a child and mother or father, the particular vulnerability I emphasize in my analysis is the vulnerability of patients
with certain conditions that necessitate caring responses. To be clear, a caring ethic in any context may certainly
evolve to fit the needs of the individual giving care and the individual receiving care.
29

Lindemann, "Feminist Ethics of Care and Responsibility," 93.

30

Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 35.
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moral experiences and intuitions of women.31 For ethics to be valuable to the aims and embodied
experiences of women, ethics needs to be modified so it ceases to neglect the voices of women.
In a similar vein, “feminist” ethics recognizes women’s moral experiences but goes a step
further. Feminist ethics is primarily concerned with the rejection and relief of the oppression of
women.32 For Warren Reich, feminine and feminist ethics are interrelated as they share a
common goal of including women’s voices in diverse fields of scholarship and research.33 I
bring this distinction to our attention primarily because I want to reveal the mistake of equating
the aims of feminist ethics with feminine ethics. Although they share some common goals, this
distinction enables us to consider the two as interrelated but distinct methods for care theorizing.
Feminist bioethics has many significant intersections with medical ethics, some of the
most prominent being understanding of context and balancing inequalities within relationships.
Feminist philosopher Susan Sherwin notes that, “medical ethics shares with feminist ethics a
commitment to focus on context and an understanding of the significance of inequality within
relationships, and some authors in medical ethics express a desire reminiscent of feminism to
include caring values in their analysis.”34 This is a relevant intersected issue in medicine.
However, Sherwin also criticizes medical ethics. For Sherwin,
Given their shared commitment to focusing on context in moral problem-solving, their
common understanding of the ethical significance of inequality within relationships, and
the tendency of some authors in both traditions to include caring values in their analyses,
31

Susan Sherwin, "Ethics, "Feminine" Ethics, and Feminist Ethics," in No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics
and Health Care (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 42.
32

Ibid., 49.

33

Reich, “Contemporary Ethics of Care,” 338.

34

Susan Sherwin, “Feminist and Medical Ethics: Two Different Approaches to Contextual Ethics,” Hypatia
4, no. 2 (1989): 62, accessed June 16, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3809806.
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it might appear that medical ethics is already well on its way to being feminist. Medical
ethics, however, does not display any commitment to ending oppression; thus most of the
writings of contemporary medical ethics must be judged as lacking from the perspective
of feminist ethics.35
As one of the greatest criticisms of bioethics (for feminists) as well as the medical profession,
Sherwin’s perspective confronts the problems within our health care system that are perpetuating
oppression or are in some sense not adequately attending to the needs of oppressed individuals
(including women, racial minorities, and individuals of a lowered socio-economic status). I
include this passage because it both helps to clarify the feminist-feminine distinction and
acknowledges that caring values are largely lacking in medical ethics. Most significantly, her
criticism points to the inequalities within relationships, which is a major issue we need to
confront while evaluating the caring and justice perspectives. I intend to address the problem of
inequality between the two orientations later. At least for now in regard to feminist bioethics, one
interesting question is does the physician-patient relationship oppress women as women? Does it
do so necessarily? Is it inherently oppressive or can it be overcome on a case-by-case basis?
These are important and relevant questions, however I do not have the time to fully attend to
them here. Uncovering and relieving the oppression of women, though an important issue that
regularly demands our attention, is not the direct issue I am primarily concerned with in this
work. Nevertheless, recognizing inequality and oppression is essential to evaluating the value of
both the caring and justice orientations. This process of identifying oppression and inequality,
particularly with women, enables us to critique the justice perspective more effectively and
assess how it has often neglected and even concealed real inequality.
35 Susan Sherwin, “Toward a Feminist Ethics of Health Care,” in No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and
Health Care (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 83-84.
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In “Feminist Directions in Medical Ethics,” Virginia Warren examines three feminist
themes for conducting academic medical ethics and leading discussions in moral philosophy.
The first theme she cites is diversity. Feminists know that the “one size fits all” approach
generally fails when it comes to any ethical theory, and for Warren, “we need to do a lot more
listening” in medical ethics.36 This approach enables those caring to recognize and attune to the
suffering of those being cared for. The second theme is relationships. For Warren, we need to
address the entire personality of the moral decision maker and aim to resolve ambivalent
attitudes to positions we deem morally correct.37 Additionally relevant for this second theme is
how “winning may take precedence over truth” in our moral deliberations.38 The challenge of
competing moral theories or principles may often create competitive stages of moral discourse in
which the winning argument is sought prior to an understanding of the realities of particular
situations. This brings us to the third theme, that theory should be constructed from one’s life
experience and “that life precedes theory.”39 An ethic that takes human experience as morally
significant conditions us to recognize suffering, develop compassion, and seriously consider the
particular experiences of individuals. Warren’s insights support this discussion, especially the
notion that the exclusive support of one moral theory is fallacious and inadequate to address
caring and responsiveness to others. To be clear, I am not arguing that the justice perspective
should be disposed of. Indeed, the justice perspective, if properly incorporated into a caring
ethic, need not be entirely inconsistent with the caring orientation and may be an invaluable
Virginia L. Warren, “Feminist Directions in Medical Ethics,” in Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics,
ed. Helen Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992),
40.
36

37

Ibid., 42.

38

Ibid., 41.

39

Ibid., 42.
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addition to caring analysis in biomedical ethics. In sections three and four, I would like to
investigate the core tensions between the care and justice orientations as understood through the
physician-patient relationship and conclude with potential areas of convergence between the two
perspectives.

Chandler 13
3. THE IMPARTIALIST PARADIGM: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAL ETHICAL
THEORY
Moral deliberations in ethics have been predominantly guided by impartial theories in the
forms of principles, moral virtues, and social norms. Principlist W.D. Ross offers the most
comprehensive set of principles in his seven prima facie duties, which concern future-looking
duties, duties based on past obligations, and ongoing duties.40, 41 Principlism functions by
outlining a set of moral principles that act as the beginning point for moral deliberation. Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress assert that principlism originates from the overall norms
assumed from the common morality. However, they carefully note that no single basic principle
should be accorded priority over any other basic principle.42 Their four-principled approach is
contextualized within medical situations as follows:
1. Respect for autonomy: a norm of respecting and supporting autonomous decisions
2. Nonmaleficence: a norm of avoiding the causation of harm
3. Beneficence: relieving and preventing harm and providing benefit
4. Justice: fairly distributing benefits, risks, and costs. 43
In this paper, principlism is understood as distinct from deontology and duty-based ethical
theories insofar as a principled approach to ethics does not always imply appeals to duty.

40

Judith A. Boss, “Moral Theory,” in Analyzing Moral Issues, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013),

30.
41 For the purposes of this paper, I focus on the interpretation of principlism by Tom Beauchamp and James
Childress. W.D. Ross provides a more comprehsensive account of prima facie duties and valuable insignts into how
we deliberate on issues concerning justice. Importantly, Ross claims that moral duties cannot be absolute, since there
are instances where they conflict (i.e. moral duty of nonmaleficence may conflict with the moral duty to keep a
promise.) This goes against the Kantian position that there will never be tension between moral duties, since
morality is based on reason. For more on this issue, see Boss 28-31.
42

Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, ix.

43

Ibid., 13; 25.
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Although Beauchamp and Childress claim to support a model termed by John Rawls as
“reflective equilibrium” or “a way of bringing principles, judgments, and background theories
into a state of equilibrium or harmony,” their approach to ethical principles appears to be justice
oriented.44 These four principles have traditionally dominated discourse in bioethical theory, for
they constitute the bedrock paradigm of principle-based ethics, at least in medical ethics. I define
them here as they will be utilized and evaluated in reference to the care and justice orientations
for the remainder of this work. Specifically, Kantian ethics requires one to deliberate impartially.
For Sharpe, “the principles of universalizability, impartiality and autonomy that characterize the
Kantian moral viewpoint have been welcomed into liberal theory precisely because they
establish the priority of the individual and equal moral status for all.”45 Liberal theory has
provided us with a constructive framework in which to consider one’s individual moral status as
premised on the values of equality and freedom. It is not my aim to undermine liberal theory or
principled-based ethics but to challenge our exclusive reliance on it in moral decision-making. In
his “Experiential Ethics as a Foundation for Dialogue Between Health Communication and
Health-Care Ethics,” Warren Reich outlines three main shortcomings of principle-based ethics.
First, an ethic relying solely on universal application of principles can exclude individual moral
experience from consideration and thus alienate people from their moral selves, since “an ethic
that exclusively promotes the use of universal and impersonal language drives a wedge into the
person of the professional whose task requires him or her to communicate on moral matters.”46
Secondly for Reich, the excessive abstractness and narrowness of moral concern reveals inherent
44

Ibid., 404.

45

Sharpe, “Justice and Care: The Implications of the Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate for Medical Ethics,” 299.

46 Warren T. Reich, “Experiential Ethics as a Foundation for Dialogue Between Health Communication
and Health-Care Ethics,” Journal of Applied Communication Research 16, no. 1 (1988): 18.
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problems with the (Kantian) duties to those who are not fully autonomous. Reich illustrates this
second difficulty by acknowledging that under Kantian ethics, the intellectually disabled do not
qualify for the Kantian definition of persons, since they cannot be said to be fully
autonomous.47, 48 Of course today, no one would object to the claim that the intellectually
disabled are in fact persons. This example just clarifies the lack of a particularized concern for
individuals in an ethic that emphasizes justice and reveals the need for more appropriate methods
of caring for those who are not fully autonomous. Lastly, Reich notes that principle-based ethics
instills a primary burden on health professionals for communicating.49 Arguably, this burden
already exists in any ethic of health care. However, a justice-oriented principlism complicates the
matter by deemphasizing the values of relationships through which integral communication
occurs. These values become inherently distorted by the abstractness of the principle-based
approach. Nevertheless, for Reich, the overriding shortcoming of principle-based ethics is that,
A failure to return to experience for moral insights and norms jeopardizes the credibility
of ethics. For there are many values and conflicts of values not envisioned by the use of
principles; and our actual moral reasoning most often entails values and maxims that are
much more experiential than the formal ethical principles we employ in the formulation
of ethical policies.50
Although Reich is not directly defending the ethics of care here, his emphasis on experiential
ethics as the foundation for better communication in health care is consistent with caring values.
47

Ibid.

Some Kantians argue that this is not the case for Kant’s theory. Reich’s account of Kantian deontology
and concept of “person” is sometimes dissonant with other Kantian scholars.
48

49 Reich, “Experiential Ethics as a Foundation for Dialogue Between Health Communication and HealthCare Ethics,” 19.
50

Ibid., 20.

Chandler 16
Reich is rightfully concerned with (experiential) values that are not explicitly derived from
principles, such as compassion, kindness, and caring.51 In accordance with Lindemann’s sketch
of caring values of engagement with another’s will, the caring relationship, and attentiveness to
particularities, Reich appears to advocate for a richer ethic that reaches beyond the narrow
abstraction of principlism. Despite his critique of the principle-based approach, Reich thinks that
principles are both necessary and beneficial to moral discourse. It is not so much a matter of
which theory is most correct but that principle-based ethics are both inadequate and incomplete
for moral reflection.52 Instead of outright rejecting principlism, which would be largely contrary
to the development of moral deliberation in health care, Reich contends that “ethics requires a
corrective paradigm” in medicine and attending to the suffering of others.53 His point is vital
here, for as noted before, I am not trying to completely eliminate the framework of principlebased ethics. Rather, I aim to complement the strength of principles with a “corrective” feature to
ethics, not to completely remove principles from moral deliberation. Reich’s appeal to a
paradigm correction in ethical theory with an expanded focus on experience is both compatible
and consistent with the ethics of care. Our moral insights are not purely abstract and are often
most fundamentally grounded in our individual experiences. For Reich, the stakes are high as the
credibility of ethics teeters on the line of uncertainty. The exposure of these theoretical
symptoms reveals the imperative to include experience in our moral deliberations. Having
51 Reich continues his argument by asking “what is going around me, what is occurring in this moral
world” as opposed to focusing exclusively on questions of duty. This is a valuable way to frame our moral
considerations under an ethic of care. However, Reich makes the claim that ethics is more of the study of moral
behavior than “it is the science of moral principles of duties.” I do not completely agree with this. Rather, in my
view, it is the reciprocity of principles and moral conduct that demands our attention in all matters of ethics. See
Reich “Experiential Ethics as a Foundation for Dialouge Between Health Communication and Health Care Ethics,”
20-21.
52

Ibid., 19.

53

Ibid., 20.
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explicated the principlist paradigm, we are now better prepared to analyze the justice and care
orientations and their associations with principle-based ethics.
3.1 The Justice Orientation and Its Challenges
It is important to understand what we mean by “justice,” for there are many different
senses in which the term is used. Virginia Sharpe’s article “Justice and Care: The Implications of
the Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate for Medical Ethics” examines how the justice orientation has
dominated discourse in medical ethics, whereas the care orientation has been both under-valued
and not given the serious attention it deserves in patient-provider interactions. Sharpe locates
Kohlberg’s claim that “morality is justice” in the deontological or Kantian brand of liberalism
(that all individuals equally possess liberties or natural rights and it is by virtue of this fact that
individuals bear political rights).54 These Kantian roots reinforce Kohlberg’s impartial point of
view and emphasis on autonomy. In addition, concern for the moral agent rests on the view that,
In order that he may arrive at universalizable principles of action, the Kantian moral self
or person is construed abstractly as making choices in ignorance of his own particular
desires, attachments, and attributes… the agent’s moral judgments are based on
universally applicable rational considerations, rather than on any subjective concern to
achieve a particular end.55
This abstract conceptualization of the moral agent allows the moral point of view to be impartial.
In another sense, the Kantian moral self may experience some sort of detachment from the
particular needs of individual others, since the universalizable principles of action drive the
moral agent’s decisions and ethical deliberations. This detachment is problematic for the care
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theorist. But before we move to further defend features of the care orientation, we must first
review the general tenets of the justice perspective in order to have sufficient understanding of
the tension between the two orientations.
Sharpe helpfully reviews the theoretical commitments that undergird the justice
orientation. First, since all persons are rights bearers, morally distinctive relationships are
marked by reciprocity and equality. Second, justice is blind, for the moral point of view must be
one of impartiality.56 Third, the commitment to impartiality requires that moral theory and moral
practice remain indifferent to particular aims and identities of persons. Fourth, to serve fairness
and impartiality, moral judgment must be principle-driven and dispassionate. Fifth, from
deontological liberalism, impartiality and universality are best served by a theory with no general
view of the good of individuals (i.e. the right comes before the good).57 These are all important
characteristics of the justice orientation insofar as they theoretically endeavor to defend universal
equality and rights among autonomous individuals.
The strengths of these principles of universalizability, impartiality and autonomy, “have
been welcomed into liberal theory precisely because they establish the priority of the individual
and equal moral status for all.”58 Especially under political theory in the United States, emphasis
on individual autonomy is essential to how we understand our individual rights or liberties and
how we collectively conceptualize ourselves as a nation of autonomous human beings.
Autonomy is the morally relevant characteristic, since the justice view protects individuals from
However, justice is not necessarily blind. To say that it is would infer that there is no room for
convergence between the justice and care perspectives. A better view seeking compatability with the care
perspective would note that the justice perspective frequently emphasizes the abastract. One may consider the justice
perspective as historically ignorant of individualized concerns, yet would note that justice views have the potential
to account for particularity. In fact, attending to particularity may even enhance or strengthen a justice view.
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discrimination on the “basis of arbitrary attributes such as social, economic, or personal
status.”59 These are all undeniable and really essential strengths that ground our understanding of
the moral self. There are many values from the justice perspective that we take seriously by
virtue of them belonging to the paradigm as well as considering their use in our present moral
deliberations. The central difficulty is that the justice perspective takes the relationship between
individual and state as the paradigm moral connection.60 This is inconsistent with the caring
emphasis on interpersonal relationships and attending to the particular and diverse needs of the
other. For Sharpe, “these assumptions disregard many of the features that are distinctive of the
healing relationship.”61 With the caring perspective, people are considered interdependent, not as
isolated individuals. In theories of care ethics, morality is viewed “as a matter of reciprocal
attachment rather than reciprocal non-interference.”62 Annette Baier employs these terms in her
essay “The Need for More than Justice,” where she reviews the interconnection of both the
chosen and unchosen relationships we enter. Citing Gilligan, Baier notes that “people have real
emotional needs to be attached to something, and equality doesn’t give you attachment. Equality
fractures society and places on every person the burden of standing on his own two feet.”63
Gilligan unveils this “fracturing” effect in society as the justice orientation takes the assumption
of equality for granted. The first break of this fracture likely originates from the detachment one
experiences through the privileging of autonomy as a primary principle in ethical theory. Baier
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and Gilligan are confronting the issue of non-interference in medical situations, which may slide
down the slope to neglect. This fracture in society captures the deficiency of the justice
orientation and how Gilligan tries to channel the moral maturity of women in a different voice,
namely by rejecting the narrow individualism of western liberalism in ethics. For Baier, the
problem is that “rights have usually been for the privileged.”64 In this claim, Baier is criticizing
the limited scope of a principlist approach to ethics. Impartial and universalizable principles are
supposed to protect individuals. However, emphasizing the impartial deemphasizes the
particularities of the concrete individual. To summarize the challenges of the justice perspective,
“Where, the individual abstractly conceived is the moral starting-point for the justice perspective,
in the care perspective, relationships are regarded as prior.”65 In other words, relationships are
accorded a higher moral status than the individual singular, for relationships serve as a medium
for understanding the idiosyncrasies of individual persons. Relationships are prior insofar as we
understand that our relationality morally precedes our individuality. Human beings do not just
exist as isolated individuals. Rather, it is our interrelatedness that binds us to relationships as we
grow in our moral decision-making. It is now that I wish to review the care orientation in more
depth.
3.2 The Care Orientation in ‘The Voice of Care’
In contradistinction to the justice perspective, Gilligan establishes that the care
perspective is outside the realm of the justice theory because it privileges “our moral
responsibilities toward those whom we regard not impartially, but partially –as particular
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individuals with particular relationships, needs and vulnerabilities relative to us.”66 In this way,
the component of partiality is a legitimate tenet of caring and is actually necessitated by our
movement to care for others. In “The Voice of Care: Implications for Bioethical Education,”
Alisa Carse examines the justice and care orientations as analyzed by Carol Gilligan. Carse
reviews the major challenges of the justice orientation, particularly the demarcation of
impartiality as the moral point of view. The problem for the care theorist is that impartial
demands cannot always inform us adequately about how to respond to others. It is not to say that
impartial discernment is not sometimes appropriate to our moral deliberations. Instead, it is a
claim that the impartial viewpoint does not have special authority in deciding the moral validity
of actions and judgments.67 For Alisa Carse, the paradigmatic reliance on principlism and the
justice orientation, “has had the effect of ascribing a derivative, secondary status to forms of
epistemic skill,” which involve particularity.68 That is to say that the paradigmatic and exclusive
reliance on universalized principles in our moral deliberations reduces the importance of nuance
and particularity, which are often of primary moral value in the care perspective.69 Again, care
theorists do not necessarily have to remove their deliberations from principled analyses. In fact,
removing principles from moral deliberations would likely increase the difficulties with
responding to others, for the language and terms in which we understand our motivations to act
by the virtue of caring would be altogether absent. By focusing exclusively on the application of
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universal principles, impartial justice becomes blind to the contours of suffering and the needs of
dependent individuals.
Sharpe gives a helpful summary of Gilligan’s moral saliencies as interpreted by Alisa
Carse. First, one main function of morality is the development of character traits and sense of
personal responsibility.70 The degree of our responsiveness is thus critical to our care of
individual others. Second, the main objective of moral responsiveness is to visualize others as
“singular concrete individuals with unique histories and desires.”71 This is how partiality is
legitimate under care ethics. Under this view, the one caring has a wider context for
understanding the one being cared for as well as responding to the corresponding needs that the
one cared for has. Third, the call for a moral response arises as we encounter the needs of others.
These encounters are often characterized by inequality and dependency.72 In contrast to the
emphasis of equality in the liberal view, inequality is a reality that must be recognized and not
dismissed as a mere abstract moral view. Inequality, at least among those who are vulnerable or
dependent, is a reality that must be confronted with caring values and attentiveness to detail.
Without heeding attention to inequality, health care providers will likely inhibit their own
capacities for caring. Indeed, the notion of equality is really an ideal and does not correctly
account for the experiences of those who suffer from particularized medical conditions and lack
access or means to adequate medical attention. Lastly, ethical caring requires the development of
emotions that will enable us to discern and respond to the needs of others.73, 74 These emotions
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certainly include a caring attitude, which doubles as the motivation of those doing the caring. We
will see later how all of these tenets of caring are significant to patient-provider relationships and
vital to their sustainability as genuine interpersonal interactions that aim at healing and caring for
the whole person.
Alisa Carse argues that impartialism leaves many moral capacities unaddressed, such as
informed consent in the physician-patient relationship. In “The Voice of Care,” Carse provides
four main criticisms of impartiality. Her first criticism is that impartiality is the mark of the
moral. This critique of impartiality can be best understood as the claim that there is no single or
privileged justificational standpoint in morality.75 I agree with this claim, for it does not in itself
entirely exempt principles from our moral deliberations. Rather, it simply says we cannot
exclusively rely on those principles. Carse’s second criticism is how moral judgments are
principle-derived. The main problem under this second criticism is locating where principles
apply in moral judgments.76 Care theory wants to move away from the conception of moral
judgment as essentially principle-driven. A theory of moral judgment that is principle-driven
cannot, for care ethics, illustrate adequately how to judge the moral ought.77 Notwithstanding,
principles may be “indispensable” for locating the moral stakes of decisions and checking on the
welfare of others. Carse’s third feminist criticism of impartiality is the challenge of moral
intellectualism for the justice perspective. This challenge is twofold. First, emotions are a vital
feature of moral discernment, for we often discern the conditions of others through engagement
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with our emotions.78 Traditionally, emotions are often viewed as distractions or detractions from
impartial moral judgments. For Carse, this is problematic because emotions, when properly
cultivated, alert “us to morally salient dimensions of situations.”79 These moral saliencies may
range from perceiving the troubles of a child to ascertaining the complex medical and
psychological challenges of an Alzheimer’s patient. The second part to this criticism is that
emotions “play an important expressive role in moral response,” for it is not just what we do that
is important but how we do it.80 This is one characteristic that distinguishes the care orientation
from the justice orientation insofar as care brings attention to the moral content of the situation,
not merely the abstract framework in which we often (inappropriately) universalize principles for
particular aims. To underscore this point, “the emotional quality of our response to another is not
just a matter of the motivation out of which we act; it is also a matter of the manner in which we
act. This is an important distinction, for the treatment of emotion in ethics is standardly confined
to an assessment of the motives of actions.”81 For the care theorist, confining emotions to an
evaluation of our motivations for caring actions is incorrect. These emotions or epistemic skills
should be used to develop and sustain caring relationships between those caring and those being
cared for.
Carse’s fourth and final criticism of the justice orientation concerns how we model our
relationships. The overriding tendency in liberal theory or the justice perspective is to emphasize
reciprocity in human relationships.82 This tendency has some benefits such as combating
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discrimination and recognizing the mutuality of interdependence between individuals. However,
the weight given to these so-called “equals” has led to silence in moral theory concerning
particular relationships characterized by material inequality of power, knowledge, and
vulnerability.83 This silence is part of the aim of Gilligan and feminists alike to make the voice
of care and women heard. In the paradigm of principle-based ethics, “the existence and value of
particular relationships and of human relationship more generally are treated as resting in
individual choice. Relationships are construed as among the autonomously affirmed goods we
are, as individuals, to be at liberty to pursue.”84 This further exemplifies the reality of our
mutual-interdependence of existence. However, it does not attend to those relationships that are
unchosen.
Alisa Carse criticizes the idealism of the impartialist standpoint in morality and concludes
that there is no single justificational standpoint in morality. At least for Gilligan’s Different
Voice, “Its critical lesson is not to denigrate the propositional commitments of the justice
orientation but to challenge the privileging its emphases receive in the practice of theorizing…
Gilligan does not object to the justice orientation per se, but to our exclusive reliance on it.85
This claim is consistent with the arguments constructed by Carse and Virginia Sharpe and
implicitly through Reich. Another important point to reemphasize is that we do not always
choose our relationships. For Sharpe, “Since relationships are regarded in the care perspective as
prior to individuals, unequal and unchosen (as well as equal and self-assumed) relationships can
be accorded moral significance and responsiveness rather than contract [sic] becomes the basis
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for moral interaction.”86 In section four, I will review how this particular conception of
relationships is at odds with our contemporary view of medical relationships, especially
regarding physician-patient interactions, where contractual principles of informed consent and
respect for autonomy are necessities to delivering care that is both legal and moral.
3.3 Criticisms of the Care Orientation in Biomedical Ethics
I would like to offer a few challenges and critical responses to the care orientation in
order to better understand its relationship to the justice orientation. This review of the care
orientation will help direct us to methods, which may potentially alleviate the theoretical tensions
between the care and justice perspectives. Warren Reich offers a series of objections to the ethics
of care, which I find are legitimate but constructive criticisms of the care orientation and move
us into a direction of convergence between the care and justice orientations. His first concern is
that an ethic of care may actually undermine feminism by disempowering women by
emphasizing caring as a virtuous female quality.87 Recall the feminist-feminine ethics
distinction, where feminism shares the effort to include women’s experiences but extends
feminine ethics by combating the institutional oppression of women. Caring, through mothering
and other paradigmatically feminine roles, does not need to be confined to females. In fact, Nel
Noddings claims that, “an ethical orientation that arises in female experience need not be
confined to women.”88 Reich’s second criticism is that “care” cannot function as a complete end
in itself and instead should be balanced with the justice orientation.89 I do not interpret this as a
stark criticism of the care orientation but rather as an opportunity for convergence between the
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two. It is true that the caring orientation cannot operate singularly and isolated from other ethical
perspectives, just as good caring relationships are not sustained remotely and in isolation. Third,
Reich offers that caring for others can actually lead to the neglect of the self.90 This claim is
legitimate and is certainly illustrated by the long and taxing hours health care professionals work
to care for their patients. However, this extension of oneself is a hallmark of our human
interdependencies and constitutes part of the charge for taking care of vulnerable individuals.
Fourth, the concept of care is not helpful at the institutional or social level. Reich contends that
the ethics of care cannot be formulated into general rights or principles that are typically used to
implement public policies.91 This is a much broader challenge, for it ingrained in the institutional
framework, functions, and expectations of how modern health care works. Present day health
care providers are often overworked and flooded with more patients than is sustainable for a
genuinely caring medical practice. Additionally, the process of insurance coverage prevents
many suffering individuals from receiving the quality of health care that their particular
conditions demand. Truly, this is a political challenge and will require more than the efforts of
care ethicists to reform these problems. However, at least in the meantime, bioethicists and
medical practitioners alike may at least increase their awareness of medical injustices and
consider potential steps to remedying them given the current institutional framework of health
care.
Another significant criticism of care ethics is that in ethical theory generally and
biomedical ethics specifically, relationships are not always positive contributors to a person’s
identity. In fact, caring in some contexts may be detrimental to the effective care of others. In
their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress note that,
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We can produce rough generalizations about how caring clinicians should respond to
patients, but these generalizations cannot provide adequate guidance for all interactions
with patients. Each situation calls for a set of responses beyond generalizations, and
actions that are caring in one context may be offensive or even harmful in another.92
Noting one of the greatest constraints for the caring model, Beauchamp and Childress highlight a
mistake that is easy to make in medicine as well as other fields: thinking that a general good or
aim will apply to all individual cases or situations. I find it intriguing, for at least in my reading
of this passage, there is a subtle dichotomy between emphasizing individual autonomy in the
justice perspective and its inherent neglect of the particular characteristics or dispositions of
those autonomous individuals it defends. While the justice or principle-based orientation calls for
universalizability of moral concepts, it also defends the individual as the priority object of ethical
consideration. Interestingly, the care orientation focalizes on the particular experiences of the
same autonomous individuals that the justice perspective is committed to protecting. So in a way,
it seems that the care and justice orientations are simply two approaches to the shared goal of
attending to the needs and rights of individuals. The essential distinction is that while those
assuming the justice orientation privilege the rights and equality of individuals as part of a larger
social scheme, the care orientation grants priority to the particular experiences and needs of those
individuals. What I am trying to convey is that there are definitely potential points of
convergence between the two orientations. I think that perspectives of deontological liberalism,
where the right comes before the good, may often be consistent with the ethics of care. Likewise,
I think that attending to the particular needs and moral saliencies of individuals can and should
sometimes be conducted in an “objective” or “impartial” manner in order to maximize the

92

Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 36.

Chandler 29
autonomy of the individual. With these claims in mind, I would like to consider how the two
orientations could share the role of conducting moral deliberation in medical ethics.
3.4 Justice and Impartiality: Can there be congruence with Care?
In a defense of the care orientation from the justice orientation, one of the most
significant questions we can ask is, “What is it that comes into view from the ‘care perspective’
that is not seen from the ‘justice perspective’?”93 Annette Baier poses this question in her essay
“The Need for More than Justice,” where she criticizes the predominant focus on obligations
rather than virtues in ethics. Her main complaint against Kantian morality is that justice is the
first and foremost virtue in society. Baier contends that the ideal of care cannot be fully
developed without close cooperation of others, which theories premised on a respect for rights
often neglect.94 This neglect occurs through the universalization of our principles and
justifications of our actions. For Baier, “in concentrating on obligations, rather than virtues,
modern moral theorists have chosen to look at the cases where more trust is placed in enforcers
of obligations than is placed in ordinary moral agents, the bearers of the obligations.”95 In other
words, by emphasizing our duties to others over the cultivation of our own virtuous character
traits, we arrive at a state of inequality of trust and power between two individuals. Within the
patient-provider relationship, this challenge is crystallized as physician duties (such as respect
for autonomy and assessing an adequately informed consent) conflict with the practical realities
of the patient’s medical condition, which may be at odds with the physician’s duties. In Baier’s
view, David Hume, unlike Immanuel Kant, focuses on the development of character traits. Under
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Baier’s analysis, Hume’s moral theory and attention to interpersonal relationships differs from
Kant’s, for it acknowledges that our relationships are often unchosen and how this unchosen
nature is the paradigm of our moral ties, so “one’s giving rise to moral obligations [is] more selfevident than obligations to keep contracts.”96 For Baier, the best moral theory would incorporate
men and women by harmonizing justice and care. In her analysis,
The emphasis on care goes with a recognition of the often unchosen nature of
responsibilities of those who give care… contract soon ceases to seem the paradigm
source of moral obligation once we attend to parental responsibility, and justice as a
virtue of social institutions will come to seem at best only first equal with the virtue,
whatever its name, that ensure that the members of each new generation are made
appropriately welcome and prepared for their adult lives.”97
In this way, justice is a social value. Yet, it is often a contractual social value that conflicts with
certain unchosen features of relationships. Baier’s Humean interpretation integrates justice and
care in order to adequately attend to moral obligations or responsibilities to others while
simultaneously appreciating the individual and particular needs of the other.
For Gilligan, the justice and care orientations are not mutually exclusive nor are they
opposites. Rather, “these perspectives denote different ways of organizing the basic elements of
moral judgment: self, others, and the relationship between them.”98 Again, the care-oriented
criticism of impartiality is most clearly understood as the “claim that there is no single or
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privileged justificational standpoint in morality.”99 Alisa Carse recognizes an area of
convergence between the two orientations in that,
Both deontologists and consequentialists have standardly required that moral
prescriptions be justified from an impartial standpoint. But nothing prohibits
prescriptions so justified from acknowledging partial duties and special obligations,
pertaining, for example, to people in virtue of the roles they inhabit or the specific
relationship in which they stand to others.100
In an article that expands upon “The Voice of Care,” Carse reviews an accommodation strategy
that considers the constraint of impartiality as no more than a norm of fairness. Essentially, her
accommodation strategy to the care-justice problem simply sets the requirement that similar
cases be treated similarly.101 I find this strategy both reasonably consistent with the integration
of the care and justice orientations as well as productive in the current demand for equal
treatment or insurance coverage in health care. Carse further iterates that, “the ethic of care
highlights the moral risk of relying too single-mindedly on abstract judgment –the dangers of
obtuseness and incomprehension that render judgment poor and ultimately unhelpful to those
whose lives or well-being is [sic] at stake.”102 Importantly, judgment is not limited to the justice
perspective and rather can be used in any theoretical orientation within a medical setting. It is
likely that exclusive reliance on either perspective would hinder the judgment of health care
professionals and limit their capacity to gauge the particular experiences and needs of a patient.
To recapture the point I have been defending and to further clarify the theoretical dissonances
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between both perspectives, “the focus on paradigms of abstraction, generality and uniformity are
criticized as exerting normative pressure in the direction of attending to commonality rather than
difference.”103 So in effect, primary attention to commonality has the tendency to conceal the
diverse experiences of individual persons. However, defenders of the care orientation need to
evaluate the particular experiences and medical conditions in reference to our shared capacity for
suffering. As gleaned from Jeremy Bentham, this is likely one of our most commonly shared
traits. In order for care theory and justice theory to converge, both orientations need to consider
the particular stakes of individually evaluated situations by attending to the unique and complex
medical conditions of distinguished individuals. Additionally, for the two orientations to unify,
both need to also consider their decisional consequences for a greater (medical) morality in
which caring is just, and justice is caring.
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4. THE INEQUALITIES OF THE HEALING RELATIONSHIP: IS THE ETHICS OF CARE
COMPATIBLE WITH PELLEGRINO’S MEDICAL MORALITY?
Technological and epistemological transformations in modern health care require a closer
examination of the physician-patient relationship. The importance of this relationship cannot be
overstated given the evolving nature of medicine in science, the humanities, and how society
receives medical advances. Dr. Edmund Pellegrino devoted his life and research to
understanding and improving the quality of this relationship. His groundbreaking “Philosophical
Reconstruction of Medical Morality” in A Philosophical Basis of Medicine Practice: Toward a
Philosophy and Ethic of the Healing Professions revisits the physician-patient relationship and
maps out where bioethics has taken us as well as the difficulties in medical ethics we must attend
to in the present and future. For Pellegrino, “the relationship between the professional and those
he serves is characterized by an inequality in which the professional holds the balance of
power”.104 It is this very power-differential, if we understand knowledge as a sort of power,
which is an underlying issue in clinician-patient communication. Additionally for Pellegrino,
“the physician has a special moral obligation to assure and facilitate the patient’s moral agency,
especially in light of the patient’s special vulnerability.”105 This vulnerability, I argue, is not
merely due to biomedical illness but also concerns an inherent gap in knowledge and
understanding between physician and patient. Consequentially, I see that this knowledge-gap
goes in both directions: that is, the patient lacks particular biomedical knowledge that they seek
for healing, and providers often lack the patient’s socio-cultural knowledge and values. For
Pellegrino, this is problematic. The physician and patient are tied to one another in a given
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therapeutic relationship. For Pellegrino, “Reducing the inequality in information between patient
and physician is essential in obtaining a morally valid consent, which is the vehicle for
expression of the patient’s moral agency.”106 This point is critical, since reducing informational
inequality enhances the patient’s ability to express moral agency in terms of understanding his or
her particular clinical condition. Defining agency and consent is another difficult task for those
investigating the physician-patient relationship. At least for now, moral agency is a concept
similar to the principle of respect for autonomy but is distinguished from the mere support of
autonomous decisions. According to Beauchamp and Childress, the two conditions for moral
agency involve both the individual’s capacity to make moral judgments based on the goodness or
badness of a decision and the requirement that this individual has morally judged motives.107 In
“Assessing Pellegrino’s Reconstruction of Medical Morality,” Robert Veatch responds to
Pellegrino’s observation of the inequality of information by noting that,
What is often not mentioned by those who propound the inequalities in knowledge in the
patient-physician relationship is that there is also a knowledge gap in the other
direction…The physician is reduced to the dependent status of one who has a very
partial, limited, and distorted view.108
Veatch’s response, though indirectly, illuminates how a justice-oriented approach to principles
ethics may actually limit and distort the views of physicians. In other words, we understand the
patient’s perspective as distorted or deficient, for she does not have the same training and expert
knowledge of a physician. Conversely, Veatch appeals to the physician’s perspective, which is
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often limited by the absence of interpersonal connections with patients and their respective value
systems. In my view, part of this “distorted” view of the physician has to do with a lack of
attention and concern for the idiosyncrasies of medical relationships.109 Although medical
professionals may strictly adhere their moral deliberations and medical care of patients to
universal ethical principles, these principles do not always attend to the particularities of
relationships. This is how the physician’s view can often be deficient or limited.110
4.1 The Locus of Medical Morality: Justice and Care
In the section titled “Justice and Care: Implications for Medical Ethical Theory,” Virginia
Sharpe cites the locus of medical morality for Tristram Engelhardt, Robert Veatch, and Edmund
Pellegrino, emphasizing and conceding the view of Pellegrino that the healing relationship is the
appropriate locus of medical morality. However, let us first assess the views of Engelhardt and
Veatch, since they are examples of the justice orientation applied in medical ethics. For
Engelhardt, the appropriate locus of medical morality is the person. His characteristic
qualifications for personhood include rationality, self-consciousness, and moral sense. These
characteristics establish the moral boundaries of medical relationships.111 Nonetheless, his
libertarian framework bears a variety of negative consequences for a medical ethic aiming to
harmonize justice and care. First, Engelhardt gives the principle of autonomy absolute priority
over the principle of beneficence. This is particularly problematic for Sharpe, since Engelhardt’s
I do not intend to carricature all health care professionals, including physicians, as uncaring or
dismissive to the particularities of individual relationships. Medical professionals are often limited by their allotted
time to individual patients and clinical resources. Thus lack of caring and concern for individuals is not always a
result of medical professionals simply not “caring,” but rather due to the limitations imposed by the
bureaucratization of health care.
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view holds that only consent can trigger the physician’s duty to beneficence. Engelhardt’s view
“is grounded in the principle of autonomy” and does not account for or explain why a physician
should decide to benefit those who have given or are incapable of giving consent.112 In other
words, Engelhardt’s theory does not technically allow the physician to care for an incompetent
patient, since he or she is unable to give a valid consent to medical care. Second, children and
infants [as well as the intellectually disabled] do not meet the personhood criteria he lays out.
Third, his criteria inadvertently give the fact of physical illness nearly no moral significance. For
Engelhardt, the moral agent is defined by rational capabilities. However, those suffering from
physical illness often do not have fully functioning rational skills. Sharpe objects to this view by
asserting that,
illness matters [under Engelhardt’s libertarian theory] not because it makes us anxious,
vulnerable and dependent on someone else’s help, but because the body is a substrate for
rationality…A care ethic, by contrast, will acknowledge the emotional and physical
significance of illness to the person whose embodiment and life choices are in
jeopardy.113
That is to say, we often manifest our rationality through the particular responses to our individual
embodied experiences. These experiences may involve the morally significant instances of
illness, where our mortality is endangered. Sharpe argues that a caring ethic will acknowledge
the moral significance of our mortal endangerment by acknowledging and tending to the moral
relevance of illness. Lastly and most essential for the care theorist, Engelhardt’s personhood
criteria make no arrangements for care or empathy in our moral responsiveness to others, since
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the personhood principles are the only crucial features for moral agency. Under the care
orientation, the consequence of not tending to the moral saliencies of individuals almost removes
the potential for caring responses, attentiveness and empathy. This occurs by making autonomy
the primary moral requirement (as opposed to caring values and relationality), which may result
in neglect and the reduction of moral checks on non-interference with patients.114
In a similar vein, Robert Veatch locates the locus of medical morality in impartially
derived principles. Earlier I argued that the paradigmatic view of a justice-oriented principlism
has really neglected important aspects of the caring relationship. Sharpe affirms my claim here as
she reviews the challenges of impartiality. For Veatch, impartiality is a cognitive capacity we
access via the application of a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. In this way, for Veatch, medicine’s
moral relevance is a function of impartial principles.115 The propagation of principles happens at
two distinct levels in Veatch’s theory. At the first level of social contract, “the most basic social
principles for human interaction” are generated, and at the second level of contract between
society and the medical profession, “role-specific duties unique to health care practitioners” are
created through patient-provider interactions.116 These interactions are where we recognize the
moral functions of impartial principles. The third contract, for Veatch, occurs between individual
practitioners and patients but does not function under impartial constraints and rather involves
the acquisition of any “residuum” or consequences to balancing the principles derived from the
first two contracts.117 Veatch’s theory actually suggests that the interaction between physician
and patient is not moral at all but rather lies outside of the moral community, which he argues is
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a community of impartiality.118 As with Engelhardt’s theory, Veatch’s theory of medical ethics
does not acknowledge the skills of care, empathy, and attentiveness that define particular
relationships with others. This leads to a second concern in response to Veatch’s theory. For
Sharpe, Veatch’s theory constrains physicians and patients by abstract principles and lacks a
method for translating these principles to particular cases.119 Veatch’s theory implicitly
demoralizes the healing relationship, as the physician-patient relationship is not accorded
specific moral status. This view of the justice perspective disagrees with the tenets of caring and
like Engelhardt’s theory, it jeopardizes the capacity of ethics to attend to the particularized and
embodied experiences of individuals.
Sharpe argues that a medical ethic honoring the care perspective would be mindful of the
uniqueness of the medical relationship between physician and patient. This view of the unique
nature of the clinical relationship originates from Pellegrino and Thomasma’s analysis of the
healing relationship. Sharpe explicates their views by first noting how the healing relationship is
marked by the vulnerability of the ill patient. Pellegrino suitably characterizes this experience of
illness as “an ontological assault” of disruption, fear, and uncertainty of the one who is
vulnerable.120 This vulnerability of the patient establishes what Pellegrino names the act of
profession, where the act or “declaration” that health care providers make extends invitations for
help to the patient.121 As charged through this “declaration,” a dependent relationship is thus
formed between the one who is ill and the medical practitioner. What distinguishes this
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relationship of dependency is the fundamental feature of inequality, for the physician holds the
knowledge and skills that the patient is without. Thus a contractual model that assumes equality
of participants in a relationship is essentially incompatible and inconsistent with the healing
relationship.122 Given the inequality characterizing the relationship, the physician makes an
implicit pledge to not exploit the vulnerable individual. This pledge restructures our notion of
respect for patient autonomy by understanding that the willingness to become a patient expresses
the awareness that autonomy becomes more limited within the context of illness. Therefore, it is
only through the enhancement of the patient’s “diminished autonomy” that the physician can
truly attend to the patient’s needs. In this way, autonomy is not considered a principle but rather
a critical feature of working for the good of the patient.123
Pellegrino’s second notion of the healing relationship concerns the act of medicine, which
embodies the moral and technical particularization of medical care, for it acts as “the vehicle of
authenticity and the bridge which joins the need of the one seeking help with the promise of the
one professing to help.”124 This act is the telos of the clinical relationship, for its ultimate aim is
the good of the patient. Sharpe explicates an important distinction between the right and the good
as it applies to particular acts of healing. In her evaluation of Pellegrino’s distinction, Sharpe
asserts that,
The healing action is right in the sense that it is technically, scientifically and logically
sound and in conformity with the patient’s medical needs. The healing action is good in
the sense that it accords with the goals and values of the patient in the achievement of
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healing or wholeness. A morally sound response will necessarily be attentive to the
patient as a particular, concrete individual.125
In my view, this distinction reveals a potential convergence of the justice and care orientations,
for unlike in the justice orientation where the right precedes the good, both are afforded equal
status in the Pellegrino’s formulation of the healing relationship for the very fact that they both
aim for the telos of the clinical relationship. This telos is a blend of features from both
orientations and accords moral significance to both the technical-medical components of the
relationship, which the care orientation often places behind caring, as well as the values of
patients, which the justice perspective often places behind principles. According to Sharpe, there
are two important implications for the healing relationship as we interpret it as unique and the
locus of medical morality. First, a theory marking the healing relationship as the locus of medical
morality will recognize that moral responsiveness between the physician and patient will
necessitate genuine and open dialogue. This dialogue may be fostered by medical ethical theory
and bioethical education that focalizes on the expansion of communication skills and empathic
inclinations that may empower medical practitioners and their patients to communicate more
effectively.126 The practical ramifications of assuming this approach in clinical relationships
results from the development of interpersonal skills (on the part of the provider), which surpass
general ‘patient management’ to a more genuinely concerned ‘patient care’.127 Focusing on the
structure of the healing relationship carries a second implication for biomedical ethics. This
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implication concerns the priority of the duty to beneficence in the healing relationship.128 In
contrast, Engelhardt’s libertarian theory views the physician’s duty to beneficence as a secondary
function of patient consent, since acknowledging patient autonomy and valid consent to care
precedes the duty to beneficence.129 Likewise in Veatch’s theory, “beneficence is a lower order
principle lexically ranked after the non-consequentialist principles.”130 In a medical relationship
oriented to care, beneficence is a primary responsibility. The physician stands in a higher
position of power and therefore carries the moral burden of care by committing his or her work
to the health of the patient.131 This burden predicates the healing relationship and distinguishes it
as caring-oriented for this reason.
Sharpe reviews other deontological constraints of the justice orientation and defends that,
“A care perspective…because it is oriented to human needs rather than to the rights of citizens
per se, will readily acknowledge the human commitment to health or healing as the motivating
force behind medical activity. As such, a care-oriented medical ethics will be teleological rather
than deontological in character.”132 In this sense, individualized attention to patient needs is
prioritized from the more generalized notion of human rights. Certainly, there are instances
where this approach could have a negative impact on clinical care, especially in cases where
family members or proxy decision-makers are carrying out the wills of a no longer competent
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patient. Nevertheless, the point Sharpe is making simply proposes that the moral force driving
medical activity is this attention to the human condition, both in illness and value-based ideals.
What exactly does Sharpe mean that a care-oriented care ethic would be teleological rather than
deontological in character? In footnote seventeen, Sharpe clarifies that she does not mean
teleological in the utilitarian sense of emphasizing the mere consequences of medical actions on
patients, physicians, etc. Rather, Sharpe invokes teleology in the sense of Aristotelian virtue
ethics, meaning the achievement of human flourishing as an intrinsic good.133 This view allows
for the care of the whole person to become a medical reality, manifested in the dispositional
traits of the physician as these traits are applied to the individualized concerns of the patient.
Justice-oriented theory in medical ethics limits the trust between physician and patient as the
contractual model of rights and equality establishes confined limits of trust in clinical
interactions. Sharpe maintains that the physician-patient relationship is characterized by a
fundamental inequality, so in a care-oriented model like Pellegrino’s and Thomasma’s, the
contractual view is replaced by a model of “fiduciary beneficence,” or beneficence reinforced by
the investment of trust in the physician.134
4.2 Evaluating Sharpe’s Interpretation of the Care Orientation
After weighing in on the two orientations, Sharpe concludes that,
the care perspective insists that moral requirements frequently emerge within a
relationship precisely because a vulnerable member of the relationship is not in a position
to spell out his or her needs. For this reason, a morality of care, unlike a justice-oriented
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morality, does not depend on the pretense of contractual equilibrium as the basis for
moral action.135
The healing relationship features the fundamental characteristics of inequality, dependency, and
vulnerability. When interpreted as a class of virtue ethics, the care orientation in medical ethics
emphasizes the significance of the particular conditions and values of patients and the respective
dispositions of the practitioners who respond to those patient’s needs. The basis for ethical action
in medical settings is not premised on the “contractual equilibrium” based on rights and duties to
maintain patient autonomy. Rather, ethical action is provoked by the duty of attention to the
individualized concerns of others and ameliorating conditions of suffering. A potential criticism
of the healing relationship, if we assume it is premised on the care-orientation, is that health care
providers do in fact enter a sort of contract when they commit themselves to the good of the
patient and duty of beneficence. So, in medical relationships, even if caring is prioritized over
principles of justice, clinical interactions still involve some sort of contract where the physician
assumes some dutiful role. The care theorist could likely respond that although there may be a
sort of contract of the principled duty of beneficence, if it even really exists, it would involve the
content of principles and not just their mere application. Alisa Carse develops this insight in her
defense of an accommodationist strategy between the justice and care orientations. For Carse,
sensitivity to the particulars of context is not just necessary to apply principles in a caring
manner but it implies the practical relevance of the content of the principles themselves. In
Carse’s words, “many of the discretionary judgments about which features of a situation at hand
are morally salient and what their practical significance is, are to be reflected in the complex
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formulation of the principle itself.”136 What this means is that the principles can and should
apply to medical interactions. However, principles are not to be employed in a mechanistic or
universal manner but rather are to be manifested through the particular characteristics of a given
situation in response to the moral saliencies of an individual’s needs. For example, one would
evaluate the autonomy of a patient by both appealing to the principled interpretation as well as
how this would apply to a patient’s decision-making capacities relative to his or her medical
condition. In this way, contextualizing the justice-oriented application of principles is compatible
with the care orientation and marks a nexus between the two perspectives. Sharpe does not
explicitly reference Carse’s accommodationist strategy, yet these views do not appear to be
inconsistent with the tenets of the healing relationship. On the contrary, it appears that by
attending to the contextualized content of impartial principles, we may improve our
understanding of the patient’s needs and values while implicitly enriching our comprehension of
the employed principles. Sharpe summarizes a major criticism of the justice perspective in her
assertion that the “narrow construal of the self is also the source of several blindspots in moral
theories that are based on the liberal paradigm.”137 These theoretical dissonances are practically
significant to the healing relationship and are critically relevant to how we can appropriately
apply principles that acknowledge the legitimate ethical truth of partiality. Impartial demands
ignore the caring qualities of engagement with another’s will and attention to particularities by
placing the right before the good. In the healing relationship, the right action of responding to the
duty of beneficence is a shared priority of attending to the good of the patient. Through an
appropriate application of principles that legitimize the reality of partiality, the gap between the
justice and care orientations may bridge, creating a richer ethic that accounts for the embodied
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concerns of concrete individuals as well as how their concerns compose a greater ethical fabric
of human experience in medicine.
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5. A MORE AUTHENTIC MEDICAL MORALITY: THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN NEED
AND RESPONSIVENESS TO OTHERS
5.1 Caring in Theory and Practice
The preceding sections have aimed to evaluate the challenges between the care and
justice orientations and establish where the two may intersect or even blend into a richer medical
ethic. Contemporary difficulties in health care concerning resource distribution, insurance
coverage, and the amount of time a provider actually has to spend with individual patients are
weighty problems that the bioethical theorists cannot confront alone. Analysis and concern for
ethics in academics must translate into applied resolutions to the difficulties that permeate the
institution of health care. Warren Reich contends that, “a principle-based ethic creates acute
problems for forging a link between health-care ethics and health communication; but if the
starting paradigm for ethics is experiential, one perceives in that approach a potential for rich
exchange and collaboration between ethical and communication theories.”138 I do not mean to
make the naïve claim that these challenges in health care will be automatically resolved by
merely focusing on the experiences of every patient. Truly, so long as there is illness and
suffering, we will continue to make valiant attempts to understand the various traits that
distinguish our human experience from other beings. However, attention to experience will likely
increase awareness of the reality of our human interdependence and the dependence of particular
others who suffer from specific medical circumstances. Despite their earlier criticisms of the care
orientation, even Beauchamp and Childress assert that the virtues of caring have the potential to
“liberate health professionals from narrow conceptions of role responsibilities.”139 By expanding
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their scope of responsibility and position in a patient-provider context, health care workers can
aim to incorporate caring values and emphasis on our interrelatedness to provide better care.
Conversely,
It is not that patients will always be correct in their assessment of what is in their
interests. But if they are educated with the assistance of physicians and others and
become comfortable telling physicians what their interests are, the patients themselves
eventually will be the most reliable sources physicians have of knowing their patients’
interests.140
In this sense, Veatch’s characterization of physician-patient communication appeals to the
patient directly for knowing an individual patient’s goals, interests, and value systems.
Although his view still contends that the clinical relationship is not designated as a moral one,
Veatch recognizes that the relationship between knowledge and caring is a significant one. The
healing relationship, as it is characterized by the fundamental inequality between physician
expertise and patient lack of medical expertise, is an inherently moral relationship. Knowledge
does not necessarily lead to caring but widens the potential for it while caring does entail
knowledge.141 When we care about another individual, we open the possibility that we will learn
something about them with the aim of fostering caring values within a relationship. To whatever
degree of analysis, caring values and practices are essential components to empathic
relationships, especially within a clinical setting.
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In sum, the caring orientation may converge with the justice orientation at the nexus of
just caring and caring justice. Care reasoning is concrete and contextual rather than abstract, yet
this claim does not need to entirely reverse the value or force of principle-based ethics.142 The
difficult task is finding where exactly these two perspectives converge in clinical settings and
how their convergence contributes to medical and social progress. For Warren Reich, “The moral
force of principles relies on the prior reality of care.”143 In this sense, the act of caring shares the
aims of principle-based ethics that attend to the moral saliencies and values of individuals that
are manifested in particular medical conditions. Reich intuits one of these potential convergences
of the two orientations in our shared capacity for suffering in that “the key to the various
constructive consequences of suffering is found not just in the development of one’s own story,
but in discovering, integrating, and identifying with an interpretation of one’s suffering.” 144 This
process of identification signifies our interdependence and necessitates the effort to attend to the
dependent states of others. By identifying with the suffering of another, one has the capacity to
enhance the moral agency of the one who is suffering. In review of the application of biomedical
ethics to the institution of health care, “[a] principal aim of a medical ethics informed by an ethic
of care would need to be to address how our institutions and practices of health care can further
empower patients and in general encourage more active participation on the part of the nonexperts in their own health care.”145 Likewise, a medical ethic that takes the justice-orientation
into account would helpfully propose solutions to the institutional challenges in health care.

142

Carse, “The ‘Voice of Care’: Implications for Bioethical Education,” 17.

143 Warren Reich, “The Care-Based Ethic of Nazi Medicine and the Moral Importance of What We Care
About,” The American Journal of Bioethics 1, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 71.
144 Warren Thomas Reich, “Speaking of Suffering: A Moral Account of Compassion,” Soundings: An
Interdisciplinary Journal 72, no. 1 (April 1, 1989): 92.
145

Carse, “The ‘Voice of Care’: Implications for Bioethical Education,” 24.

Chandler 49
Through a linkage of the justice and care orientations, we may further empower patients to make
informed medical decisions consistent with their life-views, values, and medical experiences.
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